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I Macedonia's transition and the
media
If we generally define the transition as a two-phase
movement, where the first phase is moving from
(leaving the old socialist system) and the second
phase is moving towards (which in the case of
Macedonia means the establishment and function-
ing of adequate civil and democratic institutions
and the market economy), then Macedonia and its
media scene still remain in the first phase.
Bearing in mind the function and role of the media
in society, especially when the modernisation of the
particular society is on the agenda, of primary
importance is the optimisation of the role of the
media, which points to the status of the media and
the nature of the relations it has with other parts of
society
The changes in the Macedonian media, as in
Macedonia in general, started with the disintegra-
tion of Yugoslavia. This dramatic leaving of the old
system had a big influence over the start, nature
and dynamic of the transition.1 Macedonia,
although it was not a cause of the destructive
changes, was influenced by the character of the dis-
integration of Yugoslavia.
Besides the effects of the disintegration of
Yugoslavia by war, and the effect of international
relations in the Balkan region and Europe, the
nature of the transition in Macedonia was also
influenced by other negative elements. Economic
obstacles especially limited the dynamic of transi-
tion. The war in the former Yugoslavia and the UN
sanctions against the present Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro) from the middle of 1992 to the
beginning of 1996; the Greek embargo against
Macedonia from January 1994 to October 1995,
and the pressure from Greece over the European
Union regarding its policy towards Macedonia; the
continuing instability in the region: the riots in
neighbouring Albania in 1997; the potential for
war in the Serbian province of Kosovo; all these
The process had a continuity that could be followed
from the demonstration at Kosovo in 1981 (when the
main demand was for the granting of full republic status
to the Albanian-populated province of Kosovo in Serbia)
and the consequent establishment of Slobodan Milosevic
as the leading Serbian politician in 1987.
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have influenced the Macedonian economy to
develop (if development' is the word) in very inad-
equate conditions, with closed borders and the sta-
tus of a high risk region.1
We could consider the new Constitution, adopted
in 1991, as the point at which the transition in
Macedonia officially began. Article 16 of the
Constitution, guaranteeing freedom of expression
and forming the basis for the new media system, is
most relevant to the topic under discussion here.
The article reads:
The freedom of personal conviction, con-
science, thought and public expression of
thought is guaranteed. The freedom of speech,
public address, public information and the
establishment of institutions for public infor-
mation is guaranteed. Free access to informa-
tion and the freedom of reception and
transmission of information are guaranteed.
The right of reply via the mass media is guaran-
teed. The right to a correction in the mass
media is guaranteed. The right to protect a
source of information in the mass media is
guaranteed. Censorship is prohibited.
(Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia,
Article 16, 1991)
From the media viewpoint, the main characteristic
at the beginning of the period of change was the so-
called media war in the former Yugoslavia, which
took place on two parallel fronts: one was within
each of the six republics, as a quest to win control
of their own national media, and the other was in
the media war between the different republics. In
this context it is important to stress that the media
war circumvented Macedonia! The instrumentalisa-
tion of the Macedonian media by the national polit-
ical elite failed, and the media war and
media-inspired terror did not happen there. An
important reason for this were the results of the first
multi-party elections in 1991, when no one party
managed to win a majority in the National
Assembly This party structure often showed ineffi-
ciency in parliamentary decision-making, but at the
same time it was an effective obstacle to the
The problems originating from the international
environment constitute only part of the reasons for the
slow transition. The other set of reasons are of internal
origin and have an objective nature: the structure and
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formation of a one-party transitional dictatorship,
as happened for example in Croatia or Serbia. So
the structure of the assembly and government
explains why ethnic control over the state-owned
media was impossible. This is important, because at
that time the takeover of the media by private own-
ership was only just beginning.
In the period before the first multi-party elections,
and also in the following year or two, the centres of
political power lost their directive authority over
the media. Parallel to the restructuring of the state-
party monopoly, the media were freed from a polit-
ical transmission role and began to publish differing
opinions, with which they started the process of
establishing a democratic public opinion.
2 Broadcasting
The changes in the media scene in effect began
before the new Constitution was adopted. The plu-
ralisation of the media, particularly broadcasting,
went beyond all expectation. In a period of three to
four years 210 radio and television stations were
registered. Of these, 90 were radio stations, 29 tele-
vision stations and 91 combined radio and televi-
sion stations (Secretariat for Information 1996).
However, because of the lack of adequate laws, reg-
istration does not imply a licence for a frequency or
a licence to broadcast: the number of stations actu-
ally in operation is thus less than 210. Also, in 1994
the government stopped the process of registration
of radio and television stations because of interfer-
ence with frequencies already in use. Nevertheless,
the number of those stations which do broadcast is
more than 100 - still a large number in view of the
population of Macedonia (2 million inhabitants).
The large number of radio and television stations,
however, are not all engaged in strengthening pub-
lic opinion. The majority are music studios with
advertising; their schedules containing little or no
information or news programming. In the case of
television stations the programming is richer
because of sports coverage and films. However, a
common denominator is the fact that most stations
are part of the black market: usually they do not pay
capacity of the Macedonian economy However, they
have a subjective nature too: the lack of knowledge and
efficiency of the economic and political elite in
establishing the market economy
copyright fees and pay little attention to the per-
centage of airtime that could be sold. The new Law
for Copyrights was adopted in 1996, while the Law
for Broadcasting Activity, adopted in 1997, estab-
lished the percentage of commercial airtime permit-
ted in relation to an hour of programming, or the
percentage permitted in the whole schedule.
The transitional upheavals did not by-pass the
state-owned or public-sector radio and television.
Soon after the first period of euphoric freedom
came the period of stabilisation of polïtical author-
ity A year or two after the first multi-party elections
and especially after the second multi-party elections
in 1994, the Macedonian RadioTelevision (MRT)
came under double pressure: economic and politi-
cal. Much of the initial enthusiasm was lost. The
executive and legislative powers needed almost five
years to solve the problem of inefficient collection
of licence fees, and the courts tolerated their non-
payment. MRT managed to collect barely 50 per
cent of licence fees, a situation which pressed it to
follow the commercial route of other media: a lot of
low-quality programmes from the United States.
The political pressure was most transparent in the
appointment and changing of the general manager
of MRT and the managers of its television and radio
units. The relations of cooperation andlor conflict
between the parties which formed the parliamen-
tary majority or government were directly reflected
in the appointments of the management of MRT.
3 Print media
In the print media the situation is very different.
The transition of this part of the media scene has
taken place mainly since 1996. The first three or
four years were characterised by unsuccessful start-
ups of new private-sector daily or weekly newspa-
pers. This lack of success is partly located in the low
living standards of citizens and the high costs of
publishing a newspaper; but much of the blame can
be laid at the door of the Newspaper Publishing
House (NPH) Nova Makedonija. Its untouchable
monopoly position is based on its structure: it has
its own printing house3 and distribution network
covering the whole country differentiating Nova
Makedonija from all other newspaper publishers.
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Although NPH Nova Makedonija was privatísed in
1996, the structural monopoly remains intact: the
printing house and distribution network are part of
NPH Nova Makedonija and the state is the biggest
single shareholder with 30 per cent of its equity lt
should be stressed that both before and after the
decision on privatisation, the monopoly position of
NPH Nova Makedonija has been based on the pol-
icy of the government, and the decision of the
Agency for Transforming Enterprises with Social
Capital, to keep the whole structure of NPH Nova
Makedonija unchanged.
lt could be said that the real transition in the print
media started more or less two years ago with the
founding of a new daily, Dnevnik, and particularly
in 1997 when Dnevnik radically reduced its price.
This placed positive pressure on the newspaper
market; NPI-I Nova Makedonija had to reduce the
prices of its newspapers. As an illustration, the price
of the daily Nova Makedonija used to be 30 denars
(almost DM1), Following the reduction of the price
of Dnevnik from 20 to 5 denars and of the prices of
Nova Makedonija and Vecher, the total price for
all three newspapers is now 30 denars (about 55 US
cents). The readerships increased above all expecta-
tion. In early 1998 the number of copies sold of the
three daily newspapers was more than 100,000,
which would have been unbelievable only one year
earlier.
This growth in the reading public, combined with
the occurrence of serious competition, especially
between television stations, bringing an improve-
ment in the quality of programmes, leads to the
conclusion that the necessary conditions for the
provision to the public of a variety of information
sources are already present. The near future will
show how much and how fast the public will man-
age to control the government.
There can be no doubt that today, in comparison
with five or six years ago, the media scene in
Macedonia has a completely new structure. Private
capital dominates the print media, while in broad-
casting, radio and television stations run complete
programme schedules reaching more than 70 per
cent of the population. But while pluralisation is
Thanks to the Open Society InstituteMacedonia house in Kochani, where many privately-owned
(Soros Foundation), in 1994 the monopoly of Nova newspapers are now printed.
Makedonija was broken by the installation of a printing
unquestionable, the democratic capacity of the
media system remains largely undeveloped, which
necessarily limits the possibilities for establishing
civil society
4 Media regulation and the
political elite
The lack of regulation and laws providing for the
autonomy of the media until 1997, and after that
the existence of unsatisfactory laws, are among the
main reasons for the situation already described. Six
years' experience withobt a new broadcasting law
only made the uncertainty of any investment
greater, producing various negative effects. The
owners of the stations were pressed to find excep-
tional ways to secure their capital investments; mar-
ket-oriented broadcasters needed close connections
with the political elite, so they could make a profit
only if they were in line with the political interests
of the authorities. The nature of this connection is
similar to that required for the accumulation of cap-
ital in other post-communist countries and matches
the, practice of the former political nomenklatura.
The new economic elite consists of almost the same
individuals as the political elite. The whole process
could be called political commercialisation: the
establishment of commercial broadcasters is under
the patronage of the political elite.
The pressure over broadcasting outlew increased
with the government's decision on the price of fre-
quency concessions and the adoption of the Law for
Broadcasting Activity, according to which licences
will be given.
The Law for Broadcasting Activity, although written
a long time earlier, failed to improve the situation.
The National Broadcasting Council, which was
established by this law, does not have real indepen-
dence, nor the right to make its own decisions. The
Broadcasting Council only advises the government
and the government can take decisions regardless of
its advice. This is the case whether the council
grants a licence (Article 13) or revokes one (Article
19). At the same time, there is no provision in the
law for possible conflicts between the government
and the council; so decisions connected with com-
mercial broadcasting stay with the executive power.
On the other hand, although statements have been
made with the aim of assuring the public that the
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council is an autonomous institution, the law has
failed to specify its sources of finance: without a
clear financial base, the council's autonomy is open
to question. In Article 28 it is written that the finan-
cial resources for the council's work must be pro-
vided from the licence fee, but the amount of these
resources is not defined. To complete the paradox,
in Article 77 of the same law, where the users and
allocations of the money from the licence fee are
listed, the amount of money for every user is
defined, but the Broadcasting Council is not men-
tioned.
Many questions have been raised regarding the
solutions provided in the law to ensure its obser-
vance. It is a further source of concern that the
executive branch of government (various ministries
and regulatory bodies) can take measures against
broadcasters who act in contravention of this law,
independently of the Broadcasting Council.
It is therefore clear that, even after the adoption of
the new Law for Broadcasting Activity, private, com-
mercial broadcasting in Macedonia has stayed in the
shadow of the government. At the same time, nei-
ther this, nor the recently adopted Law on
Macedonian RadioTelevision (MRT), have estab-
lished public service broadcasting. The members of
the Board of Governors of MRT, as well the mem-
bers of the Broadcasting Council, are not appointed
with the two-thirds majority required in the
National Assembly Having in mind the experiences
of both post-communist and Western European
countries and knowing the domestic political cul-
ture, it should not be a surprise if in the nomination
of members of MRT's Board of Governors, major
attention is paid to their party affiliations. In both
laws the two-thirds majority principle is absent, and
hence the opportunity has been missed to establish
a mechanism that will prevent the interests of the
political parties from playing a dominant role in the
bodies which have regulatory functions in broad-
casting. In fact, none of the media laws has the sta-
tus of the so-called system laws, which need a
two-thirds majority in order to be adopted, like for
example the Law for Local Self-government.
As already stated, the role of the media in establish-
ing and promoting civil society is limited by
economic factors. The financial input in the media
industry is effectively limited by tax law to 3 per
cent of a company turnover.4 Maybe elsewhere
such a limitation would not have great importance,
but in the circumstances of the Macedonian econ-
omy, where a lot of firms went out of business and,
at the end of 1996, 40 per cent of the labour force
was registered unemployed (UNECE 1997), this 3
per cent limitation has a much greater negative
effect. If we add to this the absence of foreign capi-
tal, especially in the media, then the limited capac-
ities of the media to protect itself from the pressures
of the political elite become clear.
5 Conclusion
The importance of the media for the development
of civil society is manifest if we stress the attitudes
that the new political and economic elite have
towards civil society Arato (1994) argues that the
best for the new professional politicians is a narrow
concept of democracy, which reduces the commu-
nication channels for groups outside the parties and
parliament. On the other hand, the new economic
elite behaves similarly: civil society is reduced to the
market economy as a protection of property and
privatisation, and trade unions or consumer associ-
ations are luxuries.
The nature of current relations between the media
and its environment indicates, rather than an active
role for it in establishing civil society, the impossi-
bility for it of acting as agents for or of civil society
The need for better laws is obvious. Such a
regulatory framework should provide a space for
media which will produce information according to
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professional principles, rather than to the current
parliamentary or governmental party majority, or
the interests of the small group of enterprises able
and willing to spend more than 3 per cent of their
income on media space and time.
Of course this is not the end of the story. With an
improvement in the situation (better laws and the
development of the market economy), Macedonia
will return to the old problem: how much the
agenda of daily life, as reflected in the media, will
cover citizens' needs. New problems will arise, such
as access of members of the public and social
groups to the media, and public participation in
regulation of it. But these matters are part of the
second phase, which leads towards civil society
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